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THE NEPAL CONSTITUTION OF 1990:
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Ter Ellingson
University of Washington
The Nepal constitution of 23 Kartik, 2047 Y.S. (November 9, 1990 A.D.) is a bold attempt to
institutionalize the goals of the popular movement of the Spring of 1990. In a dramatic reversal of previous
formulations , it places sovereignty in the people and makes the king the symbol of the nation, thus legally
transforming the state from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. It reinstates the system of multiparty
democracy absent since the brief democratic experiment of the 19 50s, and presents guarantees of new basic
rights. The subsequent completion ofelections and formation of a new Government according to its provisions,
even with the problems and conflicts common to such fundamental political restructurings, have provided
decisive steps towards transforming it from a theoretical document to a living reality.
The 1990 constitution will affect first of all the lives of the people of Nepal , but also will have its effects
on the work of scholars who do rese;\rch in Nepal , whether or not their fields of study center on contemporary
politics. As an institutional, and in some sense revolutionary, manifestation of the worldwide pro-democracy
movements ofthe early 1990s, the Nepal constitution should also be of interest to scholars of other areas and
general theorists interested in political change and democratic movements. Its full significance and effects
will not be known for some time to come: but even at an early stage of its implementation and interpretation,
it raises issues that deserve preliminary consideration.

Structure and Models
The new Nepal constitution is a complex document which includes a preamble, 133 articles grouped into
23 parts, and 3 appended schedules:
Preamble
Part 1: Preliminary
Part 2: Citizenship
Part 3: Fundamental Rights
Part 4: Directive Principles and Policies of the State
Pm1 5: His Majesty
Part 6: Raj Parishad
Part 7: Executive
Part 8: Legislature
Part 9: Legislative Procedure
Part 10: Financial Procedure
Part 11: Judiciary
Part 12: Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of
Authority

Part 13: Auditor-General
Part 14: Public Service Commission
Part 15: Election Commission
Part 16: Attorney-General
Pm1 17: Political Organisations
Part 18: Emergency Power
Part 19: Amendment of the Constitution
Pm1 20: Miscellaneous
Part 21: Transitional Provisions
Part 22: Definitions and Interpretation
Part 23: Short Title and Commencement
Schedule 1:
National Flag
Schedule 2:
National Anthem
Schedule 3:
Coat-Of-Arms

The first four parts deal with primary issues and definitions of the state. sovereignty, citizenship, rights
and policies. Parts 5 and 6 arc concerned with the King and the council on royal affairs,known as the Raj
Paris had. Parts 8-11 cover the 3 main .branches of government: executive, legislative and judiciary; and parts
12-16 have to do with major invcstigati've and administrative commissions and offices. The remaining
sections, parts 17-23 , relate to various issues and institutions not covered in the other parts, ranging from onetime issues concerning the transition between old and new constitutions, to technical definitions; of special
note here are the provisions regarding political parties (Part 17) , a crucial issue in the 1990 demonstrations
that gave rise to the new constitution. and the emergency powers provisions ofPm118 , providing for temporary
suspensions of political rights in times of crisis.
NEPAL CONSTITUTION: PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Whil e the organ iza ti on of the co nstituti on ge nerall y see ms strai ghtforward , the seve n-arti cle Part I,
labeled "Prelimi nary" , at firs t glance migh t see m a ran do m co ll ec tion of subjects ra nging from the vital and
profound to the near-trivial:
Part 1: Prelimi nary
1.

Constitu tion as the Funda ment al La\\'

2.

The Nati on [=people irrespective of reli gion. race. caste or tribe[

3.

The Sovereignty [vested in the Nepalese peopl e[

4.

The Kingdom [multiethni c, multilin guaL democ rati c. independent , in divisibl e and
sovereign Hindu Constitutional Monarchi cal Kin gdom : territ ory of Nepal]

5.

National Flag

6.

Language of the Nation [Nepali =" langua ge of the nation" and o!Ti cial langua ge:
all languages spoken as mother ton gue in Nepal are " national languages"]

7.

Nati onal Anthem etc. [national nower. nati onal col or. nati onal animaL nati onal
bi rd, coat of arm s, includin g it s enl a rge ment or redu ction a nd color[ .

Some of the subj ects covered here are so ,·itall y important that bl ood ha s bee n shed a nd li ves sacri ficed
on their behalf, both during the 1990 de moc racy upri sing and in ear li er ti nlCs. And yet, none of these subjects
are trivial: after all , blood has been shed and gove rnment s chall enged on behalf of the national animal , the
cow, as well. I While Ameri ca ns may have adopted the bald eagle as their nati onal sy mbol aft er the co mpl etion
of their firs t constitution and wa ited nearl y t\\·o ce nturi es to give it pro tec ti on from killin g,2 the many centuri es
of symbolic importance and protecti on of the cow before the adoption of any written co nsti tuti on in Nepal shows
both the precedence and the signifi ca nce of factors that some soc ieti es mi ght regard as "onl y" symbolic.
Indeed, the ra nge of di scourse in these prelimina ry sec tions is of the nature not only of a voicing of universa l
democratic principles, but also of a dialog on the sy mbols whi ch give shape, signifi ca nce and legitimacy to
nearly every importa nt fea ture, incl uding politi ca l instituti ons and processes. in a Hindu -B uddhi st society (cf.
Errington 1989 ). Their placement in a leading section of the co nstitution , rath er than bein g tacked on at the
end, speaks to the ongoing vi tality of such sy mbols in a culturally unique co nt ex t, as well as to a certain
continuity with the cultural past 3
Wi th its 133 atticles, the Nepal co nstituti on is considerably longe r and more co mpl ex tha n the U. S.
constitution (1 789/1979), with its 7 arti cles and 26 amendment s. and much shorter and simpler in struchrre
than the Indian constitution (1 950/1 983 ) with its 395 arti cles. IU schedul es, and J appendi ces. It closely
approximates the constitution of the People's Re public ofChina ( 1982/ 1987) in number of articles (the Chinese
constitution has 138); but, owing to grea ter length and complexity of the arti cles, the Nepal constitution is
perhaps two to three times longer than the Chinese. In ove rall compari so n. the Nepal constitution fall s fairly
high on the scal e of length and complexity, but below so me others such as the Sri Lanka constitution ( 1978),
to say nothing of the Indian constitution , whi ch form s a widely- recogni zed class in itself.
Following a general rule to whi ch the 1990 Nepal co nstitution is no exception, length and complex ity
increase with the amount of detail of admini strative law and procedures superimposed on the more widespread
and basic prescriptions of principles and gove rning structures shared by all constitutions. Thus, for example,
not only do over half of the 24 articles of the section of the Nepal constitution whi ch dea l with the leg islature
(Part8, Articles44-67) concern mailers of procedure, but al so the entire sec li on is followed by two more sections
with an additional1 6 articles (Parts 9- 10, Atti cles 68-83 ) devoted entirely to procedural matters. While shorter
constitutions leave administrative and procedural detail s to be worked out by mea ns such as enacted laws, lega l
challenges and test cases, custom and conse nsus. longe r constitutions with explicit prescriptions of such deta ils
embed them in the basic law of the land. It ca n be expected that in such cases, procedures are mo re diffi cult
to adjust and adapt to changingcircumstances. as a constitution al amendment would theoreti cally be required
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in every case. On the other hand, constitutional encoding of such details can provide safeguards against easy
abuses and arbitrary changes in procedure at the administrative level. Whether this additional protection is
worth the trade-off in procedural rigidity and resistance to change remains to be seen.
In its length, complexity and detail of attention to administrative and procedural matters, the Nepal
constitution seems to bear a family resemblance to the constitutions of neighboring South Asian countries
influenced by the long and complex Indian constitution. For example, both the content and phrasing of the
list of "fundamental rights" given in Part 3, together with the limitations placed on those rights, show
considerable resemblances to the corresponding Part 3 of the Indian constitution. Some of the formulations
regarding caste, including provisions for protection and affirmative action on behalf of castes victimized by
past discrimination, also suggest borrowing from an Indian model. Other indications of Indian influence
include, for example, the list of"directive principles and policies oft he state" (Part 4, Articles 24-26; cf. India
1950/1983 Part4, Articles 36-51), which, as in the nearly identical>vords oftheindian constitution, in principle
"shall be fundamental to the activities and governance of the State", but which in practice "shall not be
enforceable in any court."
Such resemblances notwithstanding, influences of the Indian and other neighboring constitutions are less
important in the overall balance than might be expected. The Nepal constitution describes a different type of
state: a constitutional monarchy rather than an elected-head-of-state republic, a "Hindu kingdom" rather than
a secular state, and a society in which ethnic contrasts and interactions play at least as important a role as those
of caste, to the extent that the two can be separated in Nepal's complexly distinctive social mosaic. While the
original impetus behind the creation ofJndia 's constitution was to replace foreign colonial domination with
an internally-based democratic alternative, the impetus toward creating the Nepal constihttion was to replace
one kind of internal regime with another, more democratic kind. Four decades ' experience with selfgovernment in the post-colonial world provided a much wider range of examples th<1n h<id been available to
the framers of the Indian constitution; and Nepal's constitution ref1ects the wider range of experiences and
models available to its framers. Thus. for example. in direct response to the results of political experiments
in the developing world, the Nepal constitution explicitly prohibits not only laws establishing a one-party state,
but even participation in elections by parties advocating them (Article 112/2-3). On the other hand, apparently
in response to controversies of constitutional interpretation in the industrialized world, it explicitly guarantees
the right of privacy. And the guarantee of a right to infornwtion (At1icle 16) reflects a sophisticated awareness
of the political implications of contemporary world trends that seems far less likely to have been included even
a decade or two earlier.
If the Nepal constitution is not a clone of the Indian, neither is it of the Chinese nor of any other single
or dominant prototype. A Communist member of the framing commission suggests th<1t the postwar Japanese
constitution was the most itilluential foreign model because of its example of a workable system of
constitutional monarchy (private communication) ; but the Nepal constitution is as fundamentally different
from Japan's constitution as it is from those of India, China, the U.S., or any other single country. Nor is there
a single ideological model : it expresses. for example, a high degree of concern with social and economic rights
and welfare of ordinary people and disadvantaged groups, while still maintaining a right to property.
Reflecting a broad awareness of political, economic and ideological diversity and change in the world at large,
the 1990 Nepal constitution is as complexly related to its counterparts in other nations as it is to its most direct
model, the previous Nepal constitution, with which it shares fundamental similarities and differences.

Popular Sovereignty, Constitutionalism and Constitutional Monarchy
The new constitution explicitly identifies.sovereignty as ''vested" and " inherent" in the Nepalese people.
The basic formulation on the subject is contained in Part 1, Article 3:

NEPAL CONSTITUTION: PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
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The Sovereignty: The sovereignly of Nepal is vested in the Nepalese people and shall be
exercised in accordance with the provisions of thi s Co nst itution.
(Article 3)

This seemingly simple statement has co mpl ex and powerful implications. Some of these can be seen in
a comparison of the preambles oft he 1962 and 1990 co nsl ituiions, where sovereign powers formerly "inheren t
in" the King, "devolved on Us" by inheritance "from Our August and Revered Forefathers" are now defined
as inherent in the people, with authorities to be "exercised by" the King "in accordance with the provisions
of this Constitution." The transfer of sovereignty to the people, then. is the cornerstone on which the new
structure of a constitutional monarchy is to be erected.
PREAMBLE [1962 Conslilulion]:
Whereas it is desirable in the best
interest and for all-round progress of
the kingdom of Nepal and of the
Nepalese people to conduct the government of the country in consonance with the popular wi II ; ...
And whereas the happiness and prosperity of Our beloved subjects have
always been Our only objective for
the accomplishment of which we are
solemnly resolved; ...
Now, THEREFORE, I, King Mahendra
Bir Bikram Shah Deva, in exercise of
the sovereign powers and prerogatives inherent in Us according to the

constitutional law, custom and usage
of Our country and which devoh ed
1

on Usfro/11 Olii·August and Revered
Forefathers, do hereby enact ;wd pro-

mulgate this Constitution.

PREAMBLE [1990 Constitution]:
Whereas We are convinced that in
the independent and sovere ig n
Nepa l, the source of authority is
inherent in the people. and, there-

fore, we have from time to time,
made known our desire to conduct
the government of the country in
co nsonance with the popular will ; ...
Now, therefore, keeping in view the
desire of the people that the state
authoritvand S0\ 1ereign poll'ers shall,
ajfer the col/tlltencement of this Constittttion, be exercised in accordance
with the provisions of this Constitu tion , 1, KING BIRENDRA BJR
BIKRAM SHAHDEVA, by virtue of
t!te State authority as exercised by
Us, do hereby Enact and Promulgate

this CONSTITUTION OF THE
KINGDOM OF NEPAL by and with
the advice and consent ofthe Co uncil
ofMinisters.

Popular sovereignty, a controversial issue in the adoption of! he constitution, thus would seem to guarantee
a democratic basis of government. Yet, U.S. readers, at least. may experience a moment ofcognitive dissonance
when projectingtheirexperienceofa conslilulion based on popular sovereignly that begins " We, the people ... "
with the Nepal constitution which begins and is promulgated via the Royal rather than the popular "we". The
British constitutional concept oflegislative sovereignly is not exp licitly cited in the constitution, all hough some
provisions may seem to presuppose it - and , in general. language co mparable lo the U.S. constitution's
"Congress shall make no law regarding ... " is not used. Rather, such sovereignly-restricting language is
characteristically applied to unnamed protagonists, whether groups or individuals, in a wide range of
provisions to the effect that "Questions regarding [x action by His Majesl)' and/or the government] shall not
be raised in any court" -a seemingly fundamenta l and potentially crippling limitation lo popular sovereignly,
although its real significance will only be w01:ked out in practice.
The meaning of popular sovereign!)' in the transition from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy, of
course, hinges on the establishment of democratic institutions and powers, and the nature and extent to which
the formerly sovereign powers of the monarch have been limited, transferred to other organs of government,
and/or subjected to constitutional checks and balances. Such a process ofintentional constitutional delineation
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of controls and limits on the arbitrary or one-sided exercise of power, or constitutionalism, is an impetus behind
the creation of many constitutions; in Nepal in 1990, its pe~rticular focus was on the constitutionalization of
a formerly absolute monarchy. Thus, in the new constitution, the former royal "sovereign powers and
prerogatives inherent in Us" have formally devolved to "the State authority as exercised by Us," subject to
"the desire of the people that the state authority and sovereign powers shall .. . be exercised in accordance with
the provisions of this Constitution;" e~nd the King's status, Cit least in theory, has become a symbolic one:
(2) His Majesty is the symbol oft he Nepalese nationality and the unity oftheNepalese people.
(3) His Majesty is to preserve and protect this Constitution by keeping in view the best
interests and welfare of the people of Nepal. (At1icle 27)
Yet His Majesty's role under the 1990 constitution is hardly restricted to symbolism. He is given explicit
status as a part of two of the three branches of government, executive and legislative; and his powers extend
to the judiciary branch in more than symbolic ways.
Articles 35 and 44 give the king formal status as

Cl

part of both the executive and legislative branches:

The executive power of the Kingdom of Nepal shall, pursuant to this Constihttion and other
laws, be vested in His Majesty and the Council of Ministers. (Article 3511)
There shall be a Legislature, to be ce~lled Parliament, which shall consist of His Majesty and
two Houses, namely the House of Representatives and the National Assembly. (Article 44)
Although the language of these formule~tions seems to imply equal status and balance of powers between
the king and elected officials, subsequent clauses make it clear that real checks e~nd limitations have been placed
on royal powers:
Except as otherwise expressly provided as to be exercised exclusively by His Majesty or at
His discretion or on the recommendation of any institution or officiaL the powers of His
Majesty under this Constitution shall be exercised upon the recommendation and advice and
with the consent of the Council of Ministers. Such recommendation, advice and consent
shall be submitted through the Prime Minister. (At1icle 35/2)
Thus, the king's "exercised" executive powers are subordinated to the "inherent" authority of popular
sovereignty, regulated and limited by the recommendation, advice and consent of elected representatives.
Although the king appoints the Council of Ministers, he does so upon the recommendation of the Prime
Minister, who must be the leader of the majority party in the House of Representatives, and who is directly
responsible to it (Article 36). In general , the king's executive powers are carefully circumscribed in Part 7,
and the primacy of elective representative government clearly spelled out in clauses covering a broad range
of contingencies. It is possible to envision problems if some king, in the f11ture, should be inclined to
undemocratically exploit potential loopholes such as the ability to temporarily appoint unelected persons as
Deputy Prime Minister or other ministers. their eligibility for appointment CIS Prime Minister at the death or
resignation of a current Prime Minister. the dissolution of Parliament pending elections, or other circumstances. Such a case, however unlikely it might be. would in any event require special circumstances and
complex manipulations oflegal subtleties that would seem less tempting than more direct forms of action. But,
barring the catastrophic, and assuming a normally functioning state and society, the implementation of popular
sovereignty and representative government and the constitutionalize~tion of monarchial powers seem as
straightforwardly and firmly established as under any parliamentary system.
The king's legisle~tive role is more co111plex. First of all , although the House of Representatives is elected
by popular vote, the National Assembly includes members elected by the House of Representatives, regional
representatives elected by an electoral college oflocal authorities. e~nd members appointed by the king himself:
(1) The National Assembly shall consi'st of sixty members as follows: (a) ten members to be nominated by His Majesty from amongst persons of high reputation
who have rendered prominent service in various fields of national life. (Article 46)
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Under the Panchayat system established by the 1962 constitution (Article 34 ), the king nominated 20%
ofthe members of the National Panchayat; in the new system, he appoints 17% (10 out of60) ofthe members
of one of the two houses. Nevertheless, popular objections to the absolutism of the old system did not foc us
so much on these direct appointees, but rat her on the larger number chosen by local auth orities who were
themselves viewed as subject to royal manipulation. Under the old s)'stem, these co nstituted the other 80%
of the national legislature. In the new system, they are fift een members, or 25%, of one house (Article 46/ lc),
while a majority of 58% of that house, or 35 members out of 60, are chosen by the elected House of
Representatives. Obviously, the potential for strong royal innuence on the legislature is prese nt, but not for
overriding the votes of elected representatives. Moreover, although both houses must vote on legislation and
work out differences in joint commi !lees, the House of Representatives may override the rejection of a bill by
the National Assembly, which includes the royal and loca l appointees, by a second majority vote, and pass it
directly to the king without the agreement of the other hou se (Article 6917).
The king must give assent to bills in order for them to become law, but he does not have veto power. He
may send a bill back for further discussion; but if it is again passed, he must give his assent within thirty days
(Article 71/3-4). Likewise, the king may promulga te ordinances on his own initiative when he thinks
immediate action is necessary whil e the houses ofParliament are not in sess ion ; but Parliament may vote such
ordinances out of existence as soon as they meet in session , and even without such a vote, the orclinances become
void within six months (Article 72) . Thus, in overall balnnce the king 's legislati ve powe rs seem clearly
delimited and subordinnted to democrati c institutions.
Although the king is not fonmlly defined as pnr1 ofthejudicimy, as he is with the e.xecutive and legislntive
branches, he has the power to appoint judges; and, althou gh he mu st do so with the advice ofvmious councils,
their members include judges he has previousl y appointed, allowing for the poss ibility of a growth of
cumulative influence over the yems ns other council members change with the succession of chan ging elected
governments. He is supreme comnwnder of the military, whose co uri s li e outside of the democra tic snfeguards
imposed on appointments to and decisions of the civil courts. Moreover, he has sweeping powers to nullify
tl1e decisions of an otherwise independent judicinry:
His Majesty shall have the power to grant pardons and to suspend, commute or remit nny
sentence passed by any couri, special court , military court or by any other judicial, quasi judicial or administrative nuthority or instituti on. (Ar1icle 122)
The most obvious untouched remnant of absolute power left to the king is thnt of absolute lega l immunity:
"No question shall be raised in any court about any net performed by His Majesty" (Article 31). However,
such immunity is hardly a unique privilege of the king; it also e.xtcnds to Ministers, Parlinment and various
government offices and commissions in mntters such ns the government's fnilure to implement the
"fundamental" constitutionally mandnted directive principles and policies (Article 24), recommendations or
advice given by the Council of Ministers ''or nny other institution or official" (Article 35), nonobserva nce of
rules governing the conduct of government business (Article 41), irregular proceedings in Parliament (Article
62), allocation of election seats (Ariicle 105), nnd , perhnps most ominousl y, the suspension of fundamental
rights during proclamations of emergency (Arti cle 115). Thus, to the e.x tent that the constitution may contain
potential weak spots and dangers for popular sovereignly and democracy, they may li e in immunity from
recourse against abuses from forces in the government that are not confined to a possible future resurgence
of absolutism in the monarchy itself. On the other hand , it is difficult to imagine how any government could
function without some kinds of immunities to safeguard against harass ment and malicious interference. Like
the U.S. constitution's provisions for legislative immunities (Article L Section 6: " ... they shall not be
questioned in any other place."), other democratic countries provide lega l immunities either within the text
of constitutional documents or elsewhere in.thewri tt en and unwrill en matri.x of co nstitutional principles and
practices. In Nepal, as elsewhere, their pote n~ial for democratic or undemocratic implementation will be
worked out within this larger matri.x.
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The most sweeping powers allocat ed to the Kin g me those relatin g to a proclamation of emergency :
Emergency Power: (1) If a grave cri sis ari ses in regard to th e sovereignty or int egr ity of the
Kingdom of Nepal or the sec urity of ;my part thereof. whether by war. ex ternal aggression,
armed rebellion or extreme eco nomi c disarray, His Maj esty may, by Proclamation , declare
or order a State ofEmerge n c ~' ... (7 ) After the State of E merge ncy has bee n dec lared .. . His
Majes ty may issue such Orders <IS are necessary .. .. Orders so issued shall be ope rative with
the same fo rce and effect as la w so long as the Stat e of E merge ncy is in ope rCltion. (Article
11 5)
As was the case under the 196 2 constituti on (A 11i cle 8 1) , thi s article does not requi re the King to consult
with Purli ament, the Pr ime Min ister or any elected offi cial before issuin g such a procl amatio n. On the other
hand, while the ol d constituti on only stip ulated th at the King could subsequently consult parliamentary
officials regarding terminCltion of a state of emerge ncy " if he so des ires. " the 1990 constitution requi res an
automatic review by Parliament within a specifi ed time limit:
(2) Every P roclamation or Orde r issued un de r clause ( 1) above shall be laid before a meeting
of t he House of Reprcsc ntati ves fo r approval within three month s from the dClte of issuance.
(3) If a Proclamation or Order laid for approv<ll pursuant to clause (2) is Clpp rovecl by a twothirds majo rity of the Hou se of Rcprcsc ntali\'es prese nt at that mee ting, such Proclamation
or Order shall continue in force for a period of six month s from the cla te of iss ua nee. (Arti cle
11 5)
Thus, although the Kin g's e m c rgc n c ~' powe rs arc virtuall y unlimited at th e tim e of a proclamation of
emergency, they are tempora ry an d subj ec t to over rul e by elected represe ntatives in the lon g run. There is no
provision for the extension of a sl<llC of emerge ncy beyond on e year. ;II thou gh he re. as in other situations,
tamperi ng and Clbuse could be imagin ed. As with most such questions, the real significan ce of the Emergency
Powe r arti cle will only be see n in aclu<Ii pr ; I c ti cc~ but it s pot ential effec ts on democracy and ri ghts me crucial.
and it deserves cmef1Ii at te nti on (sec pa ge 15 lHHJ below) .
In overClll ba lance, the constituti on;Ii mo na rchy es tabli shed by the 1990 constitution may seem rather
strongly inclined in the direction ofmonmchy. butnotuniqucly so. I fwc compare.[or exampl e, the constitution
of No rway (No rway 181..!/196 2). \\ C fi nd l'ii1ually the S<IIne guara ntee of legal immuni ty as in the Nepal
constitution :
The King 's person sh all be s a c r e d~ he e<Jnnol be bl;Jmccl or accused. (Norway 181 4/196 2 :
A11icle 5)
Moreover, the Norwegian constitution gives the King an <ipparcnt monopoly over power in the executive
branch. seemingly in disregard of elec ted rcprcsc nl <llives:
. T he King himself chooses a Coun cil or Norwegian citi ze ns .. The Council shall consist of
a Prime Mini ster and a I least seve n olher members .... T he Kin g sha II <Ipport ion th e busin ess
Clmon g the members of th e Coun cil of State. as he dee ms suit abl e. On ext raordinary
occas ions, the King may summ on oth er Norwcg i<ln ci ti ze ns to take a sca t in the Council of
State, .. .but no member of th e IParli aincn tlmay be summoned thu s. (No rway 18 14/196 2 :
Arti cle 12)
Nevertheless. as th e ed ito r oil he Eng!ish eel it io n of l he Norwcg i;m co nstitution ( 18 14/196 2 : 19) informs
us, "Since 1884 the Ki ng has alw<I IS chose n Co un cil s 11hi ch lw vc enjoyed th e confidence of the Starting
[Parliament]. It mu st be consiclcrccl <l firm co nsti luti onal customlh<ll a Government is bound to res ign if the
Stort ing makes cl ear tha l it clcsires <Ich;1 ngc of gm'Cl' nm cnt. " T he insta nee cleml y shows Ihat in actual practi ce,
unwritten practice may carry cqu;II or grc<ll er COIISlitutional \I'C ight than wrillen provision s, and that
"constitutions" extend furi her than t hcir documcnta ry nl <lni fes l<1lions. an iss ue we shall return to below. With
regard to the issue of constitutional monarch). the Norwegian case sh011·s th at a strong close of monarchism
in a constitution 's written provi sion s is notncccss<lrily a bar to popu lar sovereignty or th e democrati c control
NEPAL CONSTITUTION : PRELIMINARY CONS IDERATIONS
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of monarchial powers in the fu ll constitutio nal matri;.; of written and un wri ll cn provisions and procedures,
established principles and institutions and changing circumstances - for there arc few who would maintain
that the royalist language wrilten into the Norweg ian constitution has produced a correspond in gly undemocratic state. The Nepal constitution , wit h less strong but still appreciabl e monarc hist tendencies counterbalanced by stronger const ituti ona list and democratic provi sions. is li kewise embedded in a larger constitutional
matrix that wi ll shape the ultimate sign ificance of its written provis ions in ways yet lobe reveal ed.

Rights
The 1990 constitution establishes new right s for the peopl e of Nepal , and preserves others guaran teed
under the 1962 constitution. The thirteen articles of Part 3 provide for the prot ection of certain "Funda menta l
Rights": the rights to equality (Aiiicl e 11), freedom ( 12), press and pub Iica tion ( 13), regarding cri minaljust ice
(14), against preventive detention ( 15), to information (16) , property ( 17), cultural and educational right (18),
to religion (19) , against exploitation (20), against exile (2 1), to privacy (2 2), and the ri ght to constitutional
remedy of abuses (23). Some of these articles include specifications of further rights. For exa mple, Article
12, which begins by prohibiting unlawfc!l deprivation of personal liberty and capital punishment, goes on to
guarantee five freedoms: (a) freedom of opinion and ex press ion: (b) freedo m to assemble peaceably and
without arms; (c) freedom to form unions and associations: (d) freedom to move throughout th e Kingdom and
reside in any part thereof; and (e) freedom to pra cti se any profess ion . or to carry on any occupation, industry,
or trade.
Other rights are mentioned elsewhere in the constitution. For exa mple, A11icl e 26/6 says that "The State
shall pursue a policy of increasing the participation of the labour force , the chi ef socio-economic force of the
country ... ensuring the right to work, and thus protecting its rights and interests." So me rights are not explicitly
designated as such, but are neve1iheless implied and established by prohibitions of their infringement. One
of the most important of such rights, established in Part 17 and especially Article I 19. is that of citi zens to form
political parties and participate in elections.
This right to form political parties, of course, is a cornerstone of the 1990 constitution. the slmggle fo r
which was a primary cause of its coming into existence. The establishment of such a right in the 1990
constitution required the elimination of the 1962 constitution 's Article I 1/2a. a prohibition on political parties,
some\ovhat paradoxically inse11ed into the old constitution's bill of rights . This section of the old constitution,
also labelled "Part 3," was call ed "Fundamental Duties and Rights, " and bega n with Article 9. "Fundamental
Duties of the Citizen," which required "devotion to the Nation and loyalty to the State." along with exercising
one's own rights with regard to law and the rights of others. as duties of every citi zen. This miicl e on duties
was dropped, making Part 3 of the new constitution purely a bill of rights.
Many of the rights g1.1aranteed in the 1990 constitution are carried over from the 1962 constitution. These
include the rights to equality (old constitution Arti cle I 0, new II) : freedom, including a further specification
offivefreedoms as in the new constitution (old Article II. new 12); a right against exile (old 12, new 21) ; against
exploitation (old 13 , new 20); to religion (old 14, new 19): properly (old 15, new 17); and constitutional
remedies (old 16, new 23 ). Fundamental ri ghts not specifi ed as such in th e old co nstitution , but added to the
new, include freedom of the press (new Article 13): the right against preventive det ention (15): the right "to
demand and receive information on any malter of public impo11ance" ( 16 ): the cultural and educational rights
of "every community residing within the Kingdom of Nepal " (IS). and the right to privacy (22)
Important changes have also been made in the provisions of some ofthearticlescarried over from the 1962
constitution dealing with these f1tndamental rights. For exampl e. a provision for affirmative action legislation
to "protect or promote the interests of' the cjisadvantaged ha s bee n inserted into Article L1, along with a
prohibition of caste discrimination against untouchables and a guarantee of equal pay for the sa me work by
men and women (11/3 -5). Article 12/1 ga in s a prohibition on ca pital puni shment , and Article 12/2e substitutes
a guarantee of "freedom to choose any professi on. occupation, trade or to start any industry" for the old
constitution's freedom to acquire, enjoy or dispose of property (old article ll/2e), a ri ght guaranteed elsewhere
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in both documents. Article 14 establishes as a separate right the freedom from police and judicial abuses
formerly included as subsections of the right to freedom (old Article 11/3-8); and it adds a new prohibition on
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (Clause 4). Article 19, Clause (2) adds guarantees
of rights of religious communities to those previously granted to individuals; and Article 20/4 protects children
against hazardous employment. All in all , the 1990 constitution provides for substantial ga ins in human rights
over and above those guaranteed in the 1962 constitution.
However, the establishment of new rights and strengthening of old ones does not represent an unqualified
gain. In the majority of cases, the provision for a right is followed by some kind of restrictions or limitations
on that right, some more extensive than others. For example, Article 20, the Right against Exploitation, states:
(1) Traffic in human beings, slavery, serfdom or forced labour in any form is prohibited. Any
contravention of this provision shall be punishable by law; ... (2) No minor shall be employed
in work in any factory or mine, or be engaged in any other hazardous work. (Article 20)

This statement of the right is followed by a simple qualification:
Provided that nothing herein shall be a bar to providing by law for compulsory service for
public purposes. (Ibid.)
On the other hand , the complexly formulated "Right to Freedom" (Article 12), with its embedded list of
freedoms (see above) , contains a list of qualifications considerably longer than the list offreedoms they qualify:
Provided that - (l) nothing in sub-clause (a) [the freedom of opinion and expression] shall
be deemed to prevent the making oflaws to impose reasonable restrictions on any act which
may undermine the sovereignty and integrity of the Kingdom of Nepal , or which may
jeopardize the harmonious relations subsisting among the peoples of various castes, tribes
or communities, or on any act of sedition, defamation, contempt of court or incitement to
an offence; or on any act which may be contrary to decent public behaviour or morality;
(2) nothing in sub-clause (b) [the freedom to assemble] shall be deemed to prevent the
making of laws to impose reasonable restrictions on any act which may undermine the
sovereignty, integrity or law and order situation oft he Kingdom ofNepal ; (3) nothing in subclause (c) [the freedom to form unions and associations] shall be deemed to prevent the
making of laws to impose reasonable restrictions on any act which may undermine the
sovereignty and integrity of the Kingdom of Nepal, which may jeopardize the harmonious
relations subsisting among the peoples of various castes, tribes or communities, which may
instigate violence, or which may be contrary to public morality; (4) nothing in sub-clause
(d) [the freedom to move] shall be deemed to prevent the making of laws which are in the
interest of the general public, or which arc made to impose reasonable restrictions on any
act which may jeopardize the harmonious relations subsisting among the peoples of various
castes, tribes or communities; (5) nothing in sub-clause (e) [the freedom to practice any
profession, occupation. industry. or trade] shall be deemed to prevent the making oflaws to
impose restriction on any act which may be contrary to public health or morality, to confer
on the State the exclusive right to undertake specified industries, businesses or services; or
to impose any condition or qualification for carrying on any industi)', trade, profession or
occupation. (Article 12)
These detailed restrictions on specific rights are a new feature in the 1990 constitution, replacing a long
list of qualifications and restrictions applicable to rights in general inse11ed at the end of Part 3 of the old
constitution (Nepal 1962/1976: Article 17). Despite the use of language broad enough to create a certain
potential for abuse, in most cases these q;1alifications and limitations on rights seem reasonable safeguards
against potential dangers to individuals. communities or the people at large, or necessities for maintaining a
functioning government; and most such restrictions. in fact , are common practice in democratic societies.
Nevertheless, there are ~onsiderable contrasts between countries in the constitutional formulation of the
balance between rights and restrictions. In the U.S. constitution, for example, rights are generally stated in
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absolute form, without qualifications. with limitations establi shed outside the wrillcn constitution by enacted
laws, case law and precedents, and customary practi ce. lt mi ght leg itimately be asked whet her such an abso lu te,
unqualified statement of rights may create expectations ilnd encoura ge practices which strcngthenthose rights
and place the burden on those who would limi t th e m~ or whether. on the other hand. th e automati c inclusion
of qualifications and limitations in sta temen ts of right s mi ght weake n them a nd encoura ge their suppression.
Theevidencefromcompara tivecases is inco nclusive. but sugges ts otherwi se. T he U.S. constitu tion, whi le
tending towards unqualified statements of ri ght s. nevertheless spec ifies some restr ictions, incl uding a
provision for suspending hab eas corpus'' ... when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety nwy require
it" (Article 1, Section 9);4 and several amendment s in the Bill of Rights (Amendmen ts 1-10) specify similar
exceptions or include "except as prescribed by lmv" clauses. T he co nstituti on of Ca nilda tilkes the somewhat
different approach, resembling that of the 1962 Nepil l constitution. of listing spec ific rights without
qualifications in its "Canadian Charter of Rights and Customs" (Canada 1982/ 1983: Part I), but frames thi s
list between an opening statement that such right s are subject "to such reilsonabl e limits prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democra ti c society" (Section 1) , and a concluding prov ision that
the national Parliament or a provincial legislature may enact laws whi ch "shall operate notwithstandin g a
provision included in" the Charter of Right s it se lf(Section 33 ). Despit e the see mingly cripplin g lan i:,'1Jage of
Section 33 , it seems unlikely that Ca nildi ans are any less sec ure in their const itutional rights tha n citi ze ns of
the US ., with its more abso lute language . On the other hand. the constitution oft he Peop le's Repub lic of China
(China 1982/1987: Chapter 2. Arti cles 33-56) includes so me unqualifi ed stat ement s of rights in absolute terms
reminiscent of the US. Constit ution :
Citizens ofthePeopl e 's Repub li c of China enjoy freedo m of speec h. of the press, of asse mbl y,
of association, of procession and of demon stration (Articl e 35~ cf. U.S. co nstit ution 1789/
1979, Amendment 1)
But in actual practice, the impleme ntati on and exe rcise of such right s is not ilbso lute in either country,
and in fact differs to almost the greatest ex tent imaginab le in the two cou nt ries. It would seem that the presence
or absence of qualifications in co nstit ut ional stat ement s of right s is at best il secondary fa ctor whi ch, if it has
significant impact on practice, operates in the contex t of much more importa nt factors in the la rger
constitutional matrix ofwrillen and unwritt en principles and practices. Thus. although unqualifi ed statements
of rights may produce a more positive imp ress ion of their strength and importance in a particul ar soc iety, whil e
frequent qualifications and limits as in the new Nepal constitution may evoke the impression of a di strust or
uneasiness about rights, nevertheless the hi ghl y qualili cd ri ghts of the Nepal co nstitution may, in the process
of implementation and interpretation over the course of time, prove as strong and important, or even more so,
than those stated in more absolute terms elsewhere.
One factor which may prove crucial in thi s process. because of th e dange r it see ms to prese nt , is the issue
of suspension of rights during a state of emerge ncy (see al so page 9 000 above). Arti cle 11 5 allows for broad
suspensions of rights in such emergencies:
If a grave crisis arises in regard to the sove reignty or int egrity of the Ki ngclom of Nepal or
the security of any part thereo f, whether by war. ex ternal aggression . armed rebellion or
extreme economic disarray, His Majesty may, by Proclamation. declare or order a State of
Emergency .... (8) His Majest)' may , at the time of making a Proclamation or Order of a State
of Emergency pursuant to clause ( 1), suspend sub-c lauses (a), (b) , (d) and (e) of clause (2)
of Article 12, clause (1) of Article 13 and Articles 15, 16, 17, 22 and 23 of this Constitution
for as long as the Proclamation is in operation: Provided that the right to the remedy of
habeas corpus under Article 23 s hall not be suspended. (Article 11 5)

In the 1962 constitution 's emergency powers provisions (At1icle 81 ), the King could suspend "all or any"
articles of the constitution. In the 1990 constitution. the ri ght s subj ect to suspension under emergency
proclamations are limited in number ~ they include: Article 12, the right to freedom 's Clause 2a, freedom of
opinion and eli.'}Jression; 2b, freedom to assemble peaceably and without arm s~ 2d, freedom to move throughout
the Kingdom and reside an)'\\;here; and 2e, freedom to practice any profession, occupation, industry. or trade;
10
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as well as the press and publication right, guaranteeing freedom from censorship (Article 13); the right against
preventive detention (15) ; the right to information (16); the right to property (17); the right to privacy (22);
and the right to constitutional remedy against official oppression and abuses (23). Individuals do, however,
have recourse within three monthsoftermination of a proclamation of emergency to seek compensation in court
for "any damage ... inflicted upon any person by an act of any official which was done in contravention of law
or in bad faith" during the emergency. Except under these narrowly-defined circumstances, there is no legal
remedy for deprivation of rights :
(9) In circumstances where His Majesty has suspended any Article of this Constitution .. .,
no petition may lie, nor question be raised in any co uti for the enforcement of the fundamental
right conferred by such Article. (Article 115)
If the cumulative weight of restrictions and potential revocability of rights suggests a certain air of
authoritarianism, and the impression that the constitution's "fundamental" rights are somewhat more
insubstantial and precarious than might be hoped for, it is no accident that much of this impression comes from
the Emergency Power article. Such provisions for emergencies are both part of the necessary crisis-handling
mechanisms of democracies, and, as worldwide experience has shown, pat1 of the most effective political
weaponry ofaspiring autocrats and tyrants. It is obvious that the occasional use of emergency powers elsewhere
to topple democracies does not make them any more a candidate for elimination than other institutions that
have brought down democracies, such as <nmies or elections. Nevertheless, because emergency powers are
by nature authoritarian and rights-restricting, their use in democracies would seem to call for special safeguards
against misuse. In the lengths to which the Nepal constitution has gone to protect the government against
disruptions by its own citizens, both in emergencies and in the restriction of rights under everyday non-crisis
conditions, it is difftcult to imagine what place those rights now occupy on the continuum between political/
legal efficacy and quasi-mythical ideological symbolism . This issue remains one of the more perplexing and
crucial questions in the transition to the new constitution.

Ethnicity, Caste, Language, Religion
One of the most pervasive problems of modern world politics has been the difftculty of reconciling 19thcentury European ideals of the ethnic and cultural homogeneity in the "nation-state" with 20th-century
realities of multiethnic and multicultural polities.\ In the decades following the mid-20th-centuty wave of
decolonization, many writers assumed this problem to be patiicularly characteristic of the newly independent
nations of the Third World, stemming from the "artificial" creation of boundaries by colonial powers.
Experience in recent decades suggests thai both ethnic and cultural diversity and their associated problems are
important political factors in both industrialized and Third World countries, neither simply nor characteristically associated with previously colonized stales, because homogeneity is rarely if ever found at levels beyond
the smallest locality, and hence "nations" and states are never contiguous.
Thus, the problem for all modern states becomes one of creating and maintaining a sense of "national"
unity in a polity that is inherently transnational, that is, mulliethnic and multicultural. Nepal has confronted
this problem explicitly since the formation of a mulliethnic stale by Prithivi Narayan Shah in the 1760s, and
implicitly during the growth of the culturally diverse Kathmandu Valley civilization in the preceding centuries
(cf. HOfer 1979 for a detailed historical analysis of earlier legal codes, and the issues involved). In the latest
attempt at formulating a definition of national identity, Article 2 of the 1990 constitution defines "the nation"
as:
Having commonaspirationsandunited by a bond of allegiance to national independence and
integrity of Nepal, the Nepalese people irrespective of religion, race, caste or tribe,
collectively constitute the nation. (Atiicle 2)
The wording of the same article in the 1962 constiluli'on was similar, except that it had the people "united
by the common bond of allegiance to the Crown" (Nepal 1962: Article 2). The change is obviously part of
the process of constitulionalizing the monarchy and transferring sovereignty to the people. Article 4 goes on
to define the nature of the kingdom - i.e. , the stale:
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Nepal is a multiethnic, multilingual, democratic, independent, in~ivisible , sovereign , Hindu
and Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom . (Article 4)
Here, besides the insertion of "Constitutional" , we have three new terms not included in the 1962
constitution's definition of the state: "multiethnic'-', " multilingual", and "democratic". The incorporation
of diversity into the basic definition of the stale reflects, on a larger scale, the worldwide 1990s trend away from
melting-pot ideologies in response to unsatisfactory experiments with assimilationist and hegemonist
treatment of minorities and attempts to suppress or eliminate diversity. More directly, it reflects Nepal's own
experience with past attempts to impose a "national" identity based on the cultural and linguistic heritage of
only a few of the many cultural-linguistic minorities who together constitute the population of the country.
Issues arising from sometimes draconian implementations of such policies against otherethnic-cultural groups
played a major role in the accumulation of tensions that led to the pro-democracy outbreaks of 1990; indeed,
they were one of the problems for which democracy was demanded as a solution. Thus, along with democracy
and constitutionalism themselves, issues of diversity relating to ethnic, caste. linguistic, religious and other
"communities" are crucial factors in the new constitution.
The 1990 constitution's term Bahujatlya, translated as '' multiethnic" in the official translation, is itself
embedded in the complexities of Nepal 's diverse mosaic of ethn ic, caste and other communities. A11icle 11
presents us with this set of glosses for terms relating to such commun iti es:
(1) All citizens shall be equal before law. No person sha ll be denied equal protection of the
laws. (2) No discrimination shall be made against any citizen in the application of general
laws on grounds of religion (dharma), race (varr:w). sex (linga), caste Uat), tribe Uati) or
ideological conviction (vaicarik) or any of them. (3) The Stale shall not discriminate among
citizens on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste. tribe, or ideological conviction or any of
these. (Article 11/2)
In evetyday parlance, jat can be used to refer to either caste or ethnic groups. This usage, more than the
technical definitions of Article 11 , reflects the complex interplay of identities and ideologies resulting from
the historical imposition of caste concepts and practices upon an ethnically diverse polity. As various scholars
have pointed out, ethnic groups lack the traditional occupational specializations and class-specific morality
contrasts of true castes, and, hence, lack the hierarchy-generat in g distinctions of habitual pure or impure
conduct, that lie at the basis ofthe Hindu caste system: they have no inherent place in the system, as they are
foreign to it. And yet, if the polity is to be ideologically, socially and politically "Hindu." they must somehow
be included in the system. Moreover, since the historical basis of the "Hindu" polity includes the conquest
and subjugation of some Hindus, as well as non-Hindus, by Hindus of other ethn ic groups, the constmction
of a countrywide rationalized caste system has also required the reshuffling of preexisting caste identities and
hierarchies to assure caste dominance by members of that caste with the proper ethnic and cultural ties to the
dominant ethnic group. Hence, the various allempts over the centuries to assimilate non -Hindu ethnic groups
to the system by reiiication ofcustommy behaviors (drinking alcohol , eating beef), and the resulting confusions
and contradictions, such as the treatment ofNewars sometimes considered as a single subordinate caste, and
sometimes with recognition of the complex stratification of the Newars' own traditional caste hierarchies (cf.
HOfer 1979, especially Chapters 2-4, 7, and II). Given such complexity and internal contradictions, the
collapseofthesystem maybe unsurprising; but new constitutional initiatives built on the base of such a complex
heritage, combined with an impetus to democracy (cf. Article 11 's reference to "ideological conviction") and
egalitarianism, raise an even more complex set of issues that can only be touched on here.
The tension between caste ideology .and practices of dominance/subordination, on the one hand, and
democracy, egalitarianism and the protection of rights such as equal treatment and non -discrimination, on the
other, finds expression in affirmative actioi1 provisions, some shared with the 1962 constitution and the Indian
constitution, and others new:
Provided that special provisions may be made by law for the protection and advancement
of the interests ·of women, children, the aged or those who are physically or mentally
incapacitated or those whobelong to a class which is economically, socially or educationally
12
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backward. (4) No person shalL on the basis of caste, be discriminated against as
untouchable, be denied access to any public place, or be deprived of the use of public utilities.
Any contravention of this provision shall be punishable by law. (5) No discrimination in
regard to remuneration shall be made between men and wohlen for the same work. (Article
11)

In contrast to such provisions, with their emphasis on the rights of individuals belonging to groups that
have suffered negative impacts of past practices. Article 18 introduces new provisions regarding the rights of
"communities" as a whole, expressed in positive terms:
(1) Each community residing within the Kingdom of Nepal shall have the right to preserve
and promote its language. script and culture. (2) Each community shall have the right to
operate schools up to the primary level in its own mother tongue for impa11ing education to
its children. (Article 18)
Such provisions serve as an antidote to the oppressive policies of the past and a safeguard against their
future resurgence, and provide a specific basis for the ''multiethnic, multilingual" definition of the kingdom
in Article 4. The wri\len provisions in themselves would seem to do little towards the realization of a
linguistically and ethnically diverse state. insofar as they refer specifically to private groups and institutions.
However, reports of the return of long-suppressed languages to stale school curricula and media broadcasts
would suggest that, at least in regard to linguistic diversity issues. the unwrillen range of constitutional
principles and practices are developing in accord with the pluralist intent expressed in these provisions oft he
written constitution. Whether an adequate basis has been established for maintaining the balance between,
on the one hand, the danger of regression into oppressiveness and . on the other hand, the risk of mutation of
diversity into divisiveness and coitllict. is as unsettled a question with Nepal as it is with other countries faced
with the late 20th century resurgence of ethnic nationalism.
Another obviously unsellled issue is that of religious diversity. Articles 2 and 11, among others, make
reference to equal treatment of religions and the right to practice one's own religion. a right spelled out in more
detail in Article 19 :
(1) Every person shall have the freedom to profess and practise his own religion as handed
down to him from ancient times having due regard to traditional practices: provided that no
person shall be entitled to convert another person from one religion to another. (2) Every
religious denomination shall have the right to maintain its independent existence and for
this purpose to manage and protect its religious places and trusts. (Article 19)

Yet there is at least an inherent logical contradiction between such provisions as A11icle 2 's definition of
the nation as constituted by "the Nepalese people irrespective of religion ... " and Article 4's definition of the
state as a "Hindu kingdom", irrespective of the religious diversity of the Nepalese people. Does this
contradiction in the identities of the nation and the state undermine either the integrity of the state itself, or
the religious freedom of its people'! The answer is not entirely clear. While "separation of church and state"
as in the U.S. constitution provides a strong supp01i for religious freedom. it is by no means the only available
choice for democratic countries. England. for example. has its Established Church headed by the King or
Queen, as does Nonvay. The Constitution of Sri Lanka ( 1978). while guaranteeing freedom of religion
(A11icles 10, 14), neve11heless gi,·es Buddhism "the foremost place" and requires the slate "to protect and
foster" it (Article 9). Church-stale relations and the conflicts that may arise out of them take many forms and
degrees of severity, and no simple relationship seems to e.\:isl between the taller and written constitutional
provisions. Thus, the seemingly lwnds-offlanguage of the U.S. constitution has not prevented problems such
as widespread suppression of America nlnclia n religious practices. or conll icts over al\empls to restrict Santeria
and other religions from practicing ritual sacrifice- an a \lack on religious freedom to which some traditional
Nepal Hindus would likewise be vulnerable were the~· to attempt to practice their religion in the U.S . And some
constitutionally-defined "secular" states such as India have not been strangers either to religious conflict or
to accusations of state complicity and partiality.

NEPAL CONSTITUTION PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

13

Nevertheless, theestab li slm1ent of a reli gion also estab li shes ani nevi tabl e formal inequality which im pli es
some risk of discrimination, of whatever degree of mi Iciness or severi ty: and whi ch underc ut s national unity ,
necessarily based on percepti ons of common heritage and aspirations, to the extent that those outside the
established religion feel themselves excl uded from or ·peripheral to a defi nin g characterist ic of natio nal
identity. Could such problems beaver1 ed by includin g a prm·ision simil ar to thi s on e in the Indian constitution?
Explanation II. - ... the reference to Hindus shall be construed as includi ng a reference to
persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist rei igion, and the reference to Hindu religious
institutions shall be constnred accordingly. (India 1950/1983: Article 25)
A similar provision for Nepal might read:
Reference to Hindus shall be co nstrued as includin g a reference to persons professing the
Buddhist, Shamanist or other religions existing in Nepal over the course of many ce nturi es,
and references to Hindu religion and religious institutions shall be co nstrued accordingly.
Such a provision might have the effect of extendin g protection to Nepal's other widely-followed
indigenous South Asian religions. On the other hand , it mi ght also eas ily evoke feel ings of being subsumed
in a kind ofHinducentric hegemony, despite the long hi story of Hindui sm, Buddhism, and shamanism alike
as inclusive rather that exclusive religions, able to coexi st well with other reli gions. And of course it would
not solve the problem of a religion such as Islam, also prese nt in Nepal for many centuries, or of more recent
introductions such as Christianity.
The latter religion, along with Theravada Buddhism and perhaps other traditions as well , have felt the
effect of anti-missionary provisions included in previous codes and expressed in thi s co nstitution as a
prohibition on Dharma parivartana ga ra una, ca using another perso n's religion to be changed or co nver1ed
to one's own. This prohibition was added after the draft constitution, in con formity with earli er antiproselytizing and anti-missionary laws. In the past. such prohibitions were so metimes interpreted broadl y
enough to justify action against those who changed their own reli gious affiliations to another reli gion . Such
actions were brought to bear not only on Nepalese citizens from various religious traditions who conver1ed to
Christianity, but also in some cases again st those who converted from at least nominally " Hindu" backgrounds
to Buddhism. Retention of the prohibition thu s raises the quest ion of whether a relic of the anti-democratic
past has been enshrined in the constitution, or whether, on the other hand, the equality of religions could ever
be implemented with enough fairness to allow for it s application to expansionist and mi ssio nary-oriented
Hindu religious movements.
In the case of religions and other areas, it mi ght be useful to think of rights and freedoms as definable in
two modes: parametric and quantum. Parametric interpretations of ri ghts are based on parameters assumed
universally and equally appli ca ble: e.g., all reli gions are afforded equal protection and freedom . Quantum
interpretations of rights take cognizance or the embodiment or right s and their definition s in specific human
instances, where ideals of universal equality are conditioned by the rea l differences and inequalities of
historical , political and econom ic conditions: e.g.. that the institutional bases of so me religions mi ght enjoy
vastly greater politica l and eco nomic power than others. and that an apparently eq ual contest for the loya lties
of given individuals and communiti es mi ght be no contest at all when that power ca n be brought to bear. What
from the standpoint of one religion might appear anunfair restriction or uneq ual treatment might well appear
from others' viewpoints to be an allempt to ensure that th e barefoot runner does not have to race the man in
the Cadillac. In such cases, as with other forms of affirmative action , fair trea tment might require a measure
of inequality, if it could be judiciously applied to even out an unfair adva ntage held by one side. But if such
measures were taken in Nepal, for exa mpl e, to help loca l Hinduism co mpete with international mi ssionary
religions, could or should they also be used to help religions such as Buddhi sm or shamanism compete with
whatever unequal advantages mi ght be enjoyed by the establi shed religion of the ''Hindu kingdom "?
Perhaps it is only realistic in the late twentieth ce ntury to recogni ze that so me reli gions receive massive
financing and support from international sources, public as well as private, and that traditions with loca l bases
in poorer countries may require protection and support in order to co mpete success fully with transnational
religious conglomerates, or even to survive their onslaught. On the other hand , reli gious conver1s do not
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thereby renounce their Nepalese identity , and their inclusion in ''the nation" seems as desirable as with any
other community if the state and nation are to be truly diverse. non -di scriminatory, and grounded in the identity
of the Nepalese people.

Conclusion
Written constitutions such as the Nepal constitution of 1990, the U.S . constitution, and similar documents
are only a partofthefundamental principles of governance of their respective polities. The term "constitution"
in the usage of political science and political anthropology covers a ground that extends beyond these written
documents, defining the fundamental law of a sociopolitical entity even in the complete absence of written
constitutional documents . The classic case for political science is the British constitution, a complex of
traditions extending from Magna Carta through centuries of parliamentary acts, unwritten common-law
traditions, case-law decisions and legal precedents which together constitute a f11ndamentallaw as binding as
any written constitutional document, although a unified document called a "constitution" is entirely absent.
In anthropological usage, the "constitution" of ethnopolitical entities such as the Ashanti (Rattray 1929),
Yoruba (Lloyd 1954) or Cheyenne (Hocbel 1954) is almost invariably unwritten , although the principles of
fundamental law contained in its oral traditions and practices may be perhaps more binding and less open to
djspute and ambiguity of interpretation than the wril!cn constitutions of larger nation -states. In the broadest
anthropological sense, the constitution of a given group or polity is coextensive with its culture. or at least with
those parts of culture taken as normative by its members.
If a written constitution exists for a gi\·cn polity, it is simply the documentary tip of a much more extensive
constitutional iceberg, which may depict the actual constitution in various ranges from relatively accurate to
highly misleading. The Bill of Right s of the U.S. constitution, for example, depicts rights in absolute terms
("Congress shall make no law regarding .. ." ) \\'hich in actual prnctice (that is, in the actual U.S. constitution
as opposed to its documentary codification) become qualified and limited by precedent, case lnw, and
ideological cultural consensus: "Freedom of speech does not guarantee the right to shout ' Fire! ' in a crowded
theatre. " The guarantees of freedom of religion in the Soviet and the Chinese (PRC) constitutions have not
always led to rights as unambiguous and unrestrict ed in practice as the strai ghtforward language of the
respective documents would seem to imply : nor ha s the closing qualifi er to the Bill of Rights in the Canadian
constitution, which seems to give the govcmmcnt po\\'cr to take away a lithe rights guaranteed in the preceding
clauses, in practice led to a wholesale suppression of rights. Constitutions and their language may be highly
important in symbolic terms, but the meanings of the symbols they invoke must be determined with respect
to a wider range of constitutional practices and traditions than the written documents themselves are capable
of embodying.
It is the growth and clcvclopmcnt of this \\'icier matrix ofwril!cn and unwritt en principles and practices
that will determine, as it docs in every case. the significance ofNcpal 's 1990 constitution and the issues it raises.
An introductory survey such as thi s one. based on the constitutional document itself embedded in historical
and comparative contexts, but \\'ithout sufficient clcvclopmcnt of implementation and interpretation to reveal
the larger patterns and trends of the matri.'\. can only represent a highly simplified preliminary sketch of the
issues involve. For the moment, such a sketch may be useful in identifying basic issues and potential paths
of development: but the real meaning and interest ofthc 1990 constitution will only be shown by the shape
that it takes in the hands of the nC\\ ly clcctccl representatives. political leaders, and ultimately the people of
NepaL
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NOTES
In the late 1980s, the Government submitt ed a re,·ised list of import duti es and tariffs for approval
by the National Panehayal. The discovery that the li st of duties on imported food s included the word "beef'
created such a furor of denouncement s of the Go\'crnm ent thnt a new li st, minus the offendin g term , was ha sti ly
submitted in its place.
The engle was adopted ns the U.S. symbol in I 7H2 , after the adoption oft he country ' s first constitution,
the Articles of Confederation of 1781 ; but it s status as national sy mbol \\'aS not referred to in the 1789
constitution. Legal protection begnn in 1940, and wa s further strengthened by th e Endangered Species Act
ofl973.
Regarding symbols and continuities. those interested in Nepal 's heritage of Hindu and Buddhist
Tantrism may note that the new constitution includes provisions on the "Method of Making the Sun" and the
"Method of Making the Moon" (Schedule 1).
Compare Article 115/8 of the Nepal constitution. which e.\pl icitly forbids such a suspension of hab eas
corpus even under a proclamation of emergency.
In traditional European usngc. " nations." related to notus. "birth." referred to peoples sharing a
common heritage, and was used much like the modern "e thni c groups." whether or not groups so designated
exercised absolute sovereignty over their territory. During the 18th and particularly the 19th century, the ideal
that nationsshou/dbe states and vice versa - that is. that peoples should be i ndependcnt and sovereign -became
widespread, and played a role in various revolutions and independcnce mo\·e ments. The strength oft he nationstate ideal gradually led to popular usnge that assumes the identity of the two terms. and perhaps creates the
expectation, retrospectively, that all states are ipso fnctu nations.
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